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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ISABELLE JOLLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48139-2020
Bingham County Case No.
CR06-19-3665

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

ISSUES
1.
Has Jolley failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years with five years fixed following her plea of guilty to
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon?
2.
Has Jolley failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying her Rule
35 motion for reduction of sentence?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Law enforcement responded to a call by Jolley reporting that she had been shot. (PSI, p.9.)
Officers spoke to both Jolley and Andrew Young, whom she reported shot her; both gave
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consistent accounts of what occurred. (PSI, pp.9-11.) Jolley entered Young’s home wearing a
hockey-type mask. (PSI, p.9-11.) She found Young in a bedroom, pointed a loaded handgun at
him, and pulled the trigger. (PSI, pp.9-11.) However, the gun did not discharge. (PSI, pp.9-11.)
Young knocked the gun out of Jolley’s hands. (PSI, pp.9-11.) As Jolley ran from the house to her
vehicle, Young picked up the gun and fired numerous shots towards Jolley and the vehicle. (PSI,
pp.9-11.) One of the shots struck Jolley in the leg. (PSI, p.9.) Jolley called law enforcement and
stopped at a nearby gas station to wait for assistance. (PSI, p.9.)
The state charged Jolley with attempted murder in the first degree and burglary, with a
deadly weapon enhancement. (R., pp.30-32, 43-44.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state
amended the attempted murder charge to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and dismissed
the burglary charge; Jolley pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and the
weapon enhancement. (R., pp.100-11, 114-15; 3/23/2020 Tr., p.8, Ls.8-21; p.15, L.6 – p.17, L.12.)
The district court sentenced Jolley to a unified sentence of fifteen years with five years fixed. (R.,
pp.132-34.) Jolley filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.137-39, 150-53.) Thereafter, Jolley
filed a Rule 35 motion for the reduction of her sentence, which the district court denied. (R.,
pp.155-76; Aug., pp.1-6.)
ARGUMENT
I.
Jolley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Jolley asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced her to a unified

sentence of fifteen years with five years fixed following her plea of guilty to aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon, along with the weapon enhancement. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-11.) Jolley
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has shown no abuse of discretion. Although there were many mitigating factors in this case, the
district court reasonably determined that the objectives of deterrence, punishment, and the
protection of society would be best achieved through the imposition of sentence, given the extreme
and violent nature of Jolley’s conduct.
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In evaluating
whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which
asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State
v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but presumes that the determinate portion will be the period
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of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing
Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate
to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. “‘In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not
substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.’” State v.
Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2018) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho
139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).
The district court considered Jolley’s circumstances and history, much of which was
mitigating, before imposing sentence. As the PSI detailed, Jolley grew up in an abusive household,
was used as a prostitute at the age of

and was involved in an abusive relationship with

Young, who was fourteen years her senior. (PSI, pp.12-14.) The district court acknowledged
Jolley’s young age, lack of prior criminal history, and mental health issues. (PSI, pp.7, 12, 15-17;
6/1/2020 Tr., p.27, L.3; p.28, Ls.19-20; p.29, Ls.2-4.) As the district court recognized, there are
“a lot of mitigating factors in this case, but there are a lot of aggravating factors.” (6/1/2020 Tr.,
p.30, Ls.10-12.)
Jolley indicated she initially obtained her father’s gun with the intention of killing herself.
(PSI, p.10.) Somehow, Jolley’s plan evolved from suicide, to killing herself at Young’s home so
he would have to see it, to killing Young. (See PSI, p.11.) Jolley drove to retrieve her father’s
gun because she was “angry” and wanted to kill either herself or Andrew. (PSI, p.11.) She
considered killing Young as she drove to his home. (PSI, p.11.) “She put a turban on her head
and donned a face mask when she got to [Young’s] house and went inside with the gun.” (PSI,
p.11.) She approached him, coming within an arm’s reach, pointed the gun at him, and pulled the
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trigger. (PSI, pp. 9-10, 40.) Jolley meant to kill Young when she pulled the trigger, and but for
her inexperience with firearms, she would have.
The district court expressed concern that Jolley demonstrated critical and dangerous
thinking errors. (See
- - 6/1/2020 Tr., p.28, Ls.4-13.) When asked how she felt about the crime,
Jolley reported she felt humbled by the experience and that “good & bad came from” it. (PSI,
p.11.) She reported she thinks about “suicide, self-harm, murder, violence[,] assault, etc.” (PSI,
pp.16-17.) The PSI noted that Jolley’s mental health problems include depression and self-harm,
but also “the need to kill herself or someone else.” (PSI, p.20.) Although at sentencing Jolley
clarified that she hadn’t felt the need to kill someone else before or after her attempt to kill Young,
(6/1/2020 Tr., p.11, L.19 – p.12, L.1), the fact remains that Jolley felt compelled to take another
person’s life and she followed through by attempting to do so.
The district court considered the objectives of criminal sentencing and the criteria set forth
in I.C. § 19-2521. (6/1/2020 Tr., p.26, L.20 – p.27, L.2.) The district court agreed with the state
that “it’s absolutely frightening” that this is occurred in the community. (6/1/2020 Tr., p.28, Ls.413.) The district court expressed concern about the risk to society posed by Jolley’s thoughts of
self-harm, murder, and violence; although it noted that Jolley did not indicate a present intention
to harm anyone, Jolley’s actions demonstrate her ability to follow through on such thoughts with
potentially devastating consequences. (6/1/2020 Tr., p.29, Ls.5-12.) The district court recognized
the mitigating factors, but determined that the aggravating factors were weighty, significantly
Jolley’s decision to take Young’s life. (6/1/2020 Tr., p.30, Ls.10-19.) Ultimately, the district court
concluded that the objectives of deterrence (both of Jolley specifically and society generally) and
punishment carried the most weight. (6/1/2020 Tr., p.30, L.21 – p.31, L.2.) Further, society would
be protected by Jolley receiving “the proper attention and rehabilitation in the confined setting,
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and that will serve the interests of justice as well through punishment and deterrence.” (6/1/2020
Tr., p.32, Ls.4-7.)
Jolley argues the sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating factors. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.6-11.)

As discussed above, the district court carefully considered the mitigating and

aggravating factors before it. (See 6/1/2020 Tr., p.27, L.3 – p.30, L.19.) In fact, the mitigating
factors were the reason “why the fixed portion is only five years and not higher.” (6/1/2020 Tr.,
p.31, Ls.20-22.) The sentence of fifteen years with five years fixed is reasonable given the violent
nature of the crime, the fact that Jolley intended to commit a murder on that day, the need to punish
her actions, deter her and others from taking similar action, and protect society while she receives
treatment and programming in prison. Jolley has failed to show that the district court abused its
sentencing discretion.
II.
Jolley Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Her
Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of Sentence
A.

Introduction
Jolley asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 35 motion

for reduction of sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.) Jolley has shown no abuse of discretion.
Because Jolley failed to support her motion with any new or additional information showing that
the sentence imposed was excessive, the district court properly denied her Rule 35 motion.
B.

Standard Of Review
“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,

addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415 P.3d
381, 385 (Ct. App. 2015). Where a sentence is neither illegal nor excessive when pronounced,

6

“the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion.” State v. Burggraf, 160 Idaho
177, 180, 369 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840).
“An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the
underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information.” Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159
P.3d at 840.
C.

Jolley Failed To Show Her Sentence Was Excessive In Light Of New Information
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Jolley’s Rule 35 Motion.

Jolley moved for a reduction of her sentence “based on records provided to the Court at sentencing”
and documents attached to the motion, which included letters of support from her family and
friends and her mental health records.

(R., pp.155-76.) Jolley failed to present any new

information which would render her sentence excessive.
In her motion, Jolley argued that her sentence was excessive for a variety of reasons,
including her lack of criminal history, prior abuse, Young's request for leniency on her behalf, her
age, performance on pretrial release, support system, employment history, mental health,
acceptance into drug court, education, LSI score and GAIN recommendation, and the PSI’s
recommendation. (R., pp.155-57.) This information was detailed extensively in the PSI and
considered at sentencing. (See PSI, pp.7, 12-20, 30.) Thus, it is not new information upon which
the district court could grant a reduction of her sentence. Nor did the attached medical records
constitute new information; they had previously been provided to the district court in support of
her motion for pretrial release. (Compare R., pp.89-97 with R., pp.168-76.) Only the letters could
be considered “new” since they post-date Jolley’s sentencing; however, the letters reiterate that
Jolley has gone through difficult times and has a support system willing to assist her and provide
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her with a safe environment upon her release. (R., pp.161-65.) Because Jolley failed to present
any new or additional information showing that her sentence was excessive, the district court’s
denial of the Rule 35 motion was not an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2021.

/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of February, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
EMILY M. JOYCE
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

KLJ/dd

/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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